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Farooq: Expunging Statelessness from Terrorist Expatriation Statutes

NOTE
EXPUNGING STATELESSNESS FROM
TERRORIST EXPATRIATION STATUTES
I.

INTRODUCTION

Concerns over national security and terrorism are escalating as the
United States and the United Kingdom, as well as other nations, face the
growing threat in the Middle East from the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria ("ISIS"), among others.' Following the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks, the United States and the United Kingdom developed
legislative provisions to combat domestic threats of terrorism. 2 Anti_
terror legislation as a means to deal with such threats has allowed
spying,3 indefinitely detaining,' and killing those suspected of engaging
in terrorist activities.s
1. See PETER BERGEN ET AL., BIPARTISAN POL'Y CTR., 2014: JIHADIST TERRORISM AND
OTHER UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS 19-20 (2014).
2. See David Barrett, How Britain's Anti-Terror Laws Compare, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 22,

2014, 11:55 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11051558/HowBritains-anti-terror-laws-compare.html.
3.

See CONST. RTS. FOUND., The Patriot Act: What Is the Proper Balance Between

National Security and Individual Rights? (2003), http://www.crf-usa.org/bill-of-rights-in-action/
bria-19-4-a-the-patriot-act-what-is-the-proper-balance-between-national-security-and-individual-rig.
On October 26, 2001, Congress, at the request of President George W. Bush, enacted the Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). The controversial legislation allowed for surveillance
of American citizens and others within its jurisdiction. See Surveillance Under the USA
Patriot Act, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/print/node/40883 (last visited Apr. 10, 2016); see
also Carrie Johnson, As It Turns 10, PatriotAct Remains Controversial,NPR (Oct. 26, 2011, 3:54
AM),
http://www.npr.org/2011/10/26/141699537/as-it-tums-10-patriot-act-remains-controversial
(discussing the civil liberties jeopardized under the Patriot Act).
4. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125 Stat.
1298 H.R. 1540, 112th Cong. § 1021 (2011). In December 2011, President Barack Obama
signed into law the National Defense Authorization Act ("NDAA"), which allowed for the
indefinite detention without trial of terrorist suspects. See Alton Lu, The National Defense
Authorization Act: Our Disappearing Rights and Liberties, HUFF. POST (Jan. 3, 2012),

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alton-lu/the-national-defense-auth-b_1 180869.html.
5. Through the Authorization for the Use of Military Force ("AUMF"), Congress authorized
the President to wage unfettered, permanent war against anyone that he, in his sole discretion,
deemed related to the September 11, 2001, attacks and any future attacks. Authorization for the
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Recent "War on Terror" legislation in the United States and the
United Kingdom has attempted to revoke the citizenship of nationals and
render them stateless if they are suspected to have engaged in hostilities
against the state.' By rendering human beings stateless, these laws pose
a serious threat to the international human right to a nationality and the
right to not be rendered stateless.' The legislative responses in the War
on Terror have raised legal issues relating to national security concerns
on the one hand but unnecessary inconsistencies with fundamental
international human rights law protections against statelessness on the
other.' In 2003, 2011, and 2014, the legislature drafted three distinct
immigration and national security pieces of legislation that, if enacted,
would allow officials to revoke the citizenship of U.S. citizens and
render them stateless.' In May 2014, the U.K. Parliament passed similar
legislation that permits the British Secretary of State for the Home
Department (the "Home Secretary") to strip British nationals of their
citizenship, potentially leaving them stateless.10 The purpose of this Note
is to establish that the statelessness provisions incorporated in both the
recent U.S. and U.K. legislation are inconsistent with the fundamental
international human rights protections against statelessness and to argue
that the legislative goals can be fully achieved without rendering
persons stateless.' 1
Specifically, Part II examines the longstanding and well-established
international human right to nationality and protections against

Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001); see William Boardman,
America's "Permanent War": The "Authorization to Use Military Force"Forever?, GLOBAL RES.
(May 26, 2013), http://www.globalresearch.ca/americas-permanent-war-the-authorization-to-use-

military-force-forever/5336452. In September and October 2011, the Obama administration carried
out a targeted killing operation against three American citizens in Yemen-Anwar al-Aulaqi, Samir
Khan, and Abdulrahman Al-Aulaqi. See Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta-ConstitutionalChallenge to Killing
of Three U.S.

Citizens, ACLU,

http://www.aclu.org/national-security/al-aulaqi-v-panetta

(last

updated June 4, 2014).
6. See Enemy Expatriation Act, H.R. 545, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015); Expatriate Terrorists Act,
S. 2779, 113th Cong. § 2 (2014); Enemy Expatriation Act, H.R. 3166, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011);
Enemy Expatriation Act, S. 1698, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011); Immigration Act, 2014, c.22, § 66
(U.K.); DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DOMESTIC SECURITY ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2003

§ 501

(2003),

http://www-tc.pbs.org/now/politics/patriot2-hi.pdf.
7.

LAURA VAN WAAS, NATIONALITY MATTERS: STATELESSNESS UNDER INTERNATIONAL

LAW 145-46 (2008).
8. ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, RECALIBRATING THE BALANCE BETWEEN NATIONAL
SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS (2013), http://archive.adl.org/civil-rights/national-security-and-

individual-rights.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
9. See S. 2779; H.R. 3166; S. 1698; DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 6,
10. See Immigration Act § 66.
11. See infra Part IV.
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statelessness.1 2 Part III analyzes the proposed laws and determines that
they would render persons stateless, which has severe consequences.1 3
Part IV establishes that the proposed legislation is inconsistent with
international human rights law and asserts that adequate remedies exist
to fully achieve legislative goals without the statelessness provisions. 14
Part V concludes that any legislation proposed and enacted to prosecute
the War on Terror should not render persons stateless in violation of
fundamental international human rights law."
II.

THE RIGHT TO NATIONALITY AND THE RIGHT TO NOT BE
RENDERED STATELESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

The legislative proposals in the United States and the new
legislation in the United Kingdom are inconsistent with the fundamental
international human right to nationality and with the correlative
international law duty of states to reduce statelessness.' 6 International
human rights law has developed to establish the universal right to a
nationality and the right to not be rendered stateless." Anti-terror
legislation that aims to revoke citizenship, rendering citizens stateless
and with no nationality, violates that international law."
A.

The Right to Nationality and the Right to Not Be RenderedStateless
Deserve Protection Under InternationalLaw

Nationality is the means by which human beings are able to both
develop relations with a state and assert their existence on the
international stage.'I Nationality allows a legal bond to develop between
an individual and a state, where the individual has certain duties and
rights, and the state has certain duties and responsibilities in affording

12.
13.
14.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part Il.
See infra Part I.

15.

See infra Part V.

16.

Christophe Paulussen & Laura van Waas, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism,

UK Measures Rendering Terror Suspects Stateless: A Punishment More Primitive than Torture,

ICCT (June 5, 2014), http://icct.nl/publication/uk-measures-rendering-terror-suspects-stateless-apunishment-more-primitive-than-torture.
17. WAAs, supra note 7, at 145-46.
18.

See Nora Graham, PatriotAct II and Denationalization:An UnconstitutionalAttempt to

Revive Stripping Americans of Their Citizenship, 52 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 593, 618 (2004). The law
has condemned statelessness: "Not only has American law rejected the creation of statelessness, but
international law also vehemently opposes such a condition." Id.
19. Stateless People, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr-centraleurope.org/en/who-we-help/statelesspeople.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
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protection to the individual.20 As sovereign entities under international
law, states have the power to set the rules for acquisition, change, and
loss of nationality. 2' However, through obligations under international
law, states are limited in their control of nationality. 22 These limitations
are established by treaties, "international agreements concluded between
States in written form and governed by international law"; 23 and custom,
the general practice of states accepted as law. 24 The right to nationality
has become a fundamental legal human right protected by international
law, which is binding on all states.2 5
Each state's municipal law dictates to whom nationality should be
granted and how nationality can be lost or changed.26 One way an
individual can become stateless is through renunciation or deprivation of
their citizenship by a state.27 To be stateless is to be without nationality
or citizenship.28 A person becomes stateless by losing the nationality of
one state and holding no other nationality. 29 The loss of nationality that
results in statelessness can be detrimental to one's liberty, as nationality
is the vehicle through which individuals are able to assert other
fundamental rights. 0 An individual deprived of nationality may face a
variety of consequential issues."

20. Id.
21. Div. of Int'l Prot., U.N. High Cornm'r for Refugees, UNHCR Action to Address
Statelessness:A Strategy Note, at 5 (Mar. 2010), http://www.unhcr.org/4b960ae99.html.
22. Id.
23. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 art. 2, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
24.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 102 (AM.

LAW INST. 1986). A state cannot be compelled to accept new obligations under international law.
States are, however, bound by customary international law, the binding character of which no state
can escape. Id. For an analysis on how international agreements harden into customary international
law, see the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, art. 38, May 22, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 and Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 99
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 423, 427 (2005).
25. See G.A. Res. 217 (Ill) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 15 (Dec. 10,
1948).
26. Laura van Waas, Nationality and Statelessness, OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES,
http://www.oxfordbibliographies.conmview/document/obo-9780199796953/obo-97801997969530013.xml (last updated Mar. 23, 2012).
27. See Manley 0. Hudson (Special Rapporteur), Nationality, Including Statelessness, [1952]
2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 21, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/50/SER.A/1952Add.l.
28. See U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Expert Meeting: The Concept of Stateless Persons
Under InternationalLaw, Summary Conclusions, 118, at 4 (May 28,2010), http://www.unher.org.
29. U.N. Secretary-General, Human Rights and ArbitraryDeprivationof Nationality: Rep. of
the SecretaryGeneral, 13, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/28 (Dec. 19, 2013) [hereinafter A/HRC/25/28].
30. U.N. Secretary-General, Human Rights and ArbitraryDeprivation of Nationality: Rep. of
the Secretary General,$4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/43 (Dec. 19, 2011) [hereinafter A/HRC/19/43].
31. Id. T 1.
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The United Nations High Commission for Refugees ("UNHCR")32
has estimated that twelve million people worldwide are stateless.33 There
are two types of statelessness that are covered in international law: de
jure and de facto. 34 De jure stateless individuals are those who lack a
formal bond of nationality. 35 For example, in the Dominican Republic,
tens of thousands of Dominicans of Haitian descent were rendered de
jure stateless in September 2013 after a decision in which the
constitutional court determined that they were non-nationals and were to
be treated as such-including a denial of citizenship.36 In contrast, de
facto stateless individuals retain a formal bond of nationality but are
unable to rely on their country of nationality for the protections that
nationality would ordinarily assure. 37 Although these individuals
maintain a formal nationality, that nationality is ineffective.38 For
example, there are many groups of people around the world who are
suffering under intense discrimination or oppression in the very
countries of which they are nationals. 9 Practical considerations,
32. After World War II, a study by the then-newly commissioned United Nations found that
there were protection issues for persons who had been disconnected from their own state, including
both refugees and stateless persons. WAAS, supra note 7, at 15-16. The UNHCR was the first
international law instrument that recognized the rights of stateless individuals. Id.; see also About
Us, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c2.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2016) (explaining
that the UNHCR was "mandated to lead and co-ordinate international action to protect refugees"
and was also "mandated to help stateless people").
33. Div. of Int'l Prot., supra note 21, at 4; see also Indira Goris et al., Statelessness: What It ls
and Why It Matters, FORCED MIGRATION REV., Apr. 2009, at 4,4 ("Estimates of the current number

of stateless persons in the world range from about 11 to 15 million. There is not only a lack of
systematic attention given to collecting reliable statistics but also a lack of consensus on whom to
include when counting stateless people.").
34. See Jay Milbrandt, Stateless, 20 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 75, 81 (2011).
35. WAAS, supra note 7, at 20.
36. RUMA MANDAL & AMANDA GRAY, THE ROYAL INST. OF INT'L AFFAIRS, OUT OF THE
SHADOwS: THE TREATMENT OF STATELESSNESS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (2014),

http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/fielddocument/20141029Statelessnes
sMandalGray.pdf. There are many examples of groups of de jure stateless individuals. Id. Another
example is the Rohingya, a Muslim minority group from western Burma. See LAURA BINGHAM ET
AL., OPEN Soc'Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, DE JURE STATELESSNESS IN THE REAL WORLD: APPLYING

THE PRATO SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS 19 (James A. Goldston & Robert 0. Varenik eds., 2011),
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/prato-statelessness-20110303.pdf
("The
[Burmese] ruling military regime does not consider the Rohingya to be citizens and restricts all
basic human rights, including prohibiting them from leaving the geographically isolated area where
they live.").
37. WAAS, supra note 7, at 20.
38.

What

Is

Statelessness?,

INT'L

OBSERVATORY

ON

STATELESSNESS,

http://www.nationalityforall.org/whatis (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
39. See, e.g., Paul White, Reducing De Facto Statelessness in Nepal, FORCED MIGRATION
REv., Apr. 2009, at 28, 28. The UNHCR estimated that in 2009 there were approximately 800,000
de facto stateless Nepali citizens. Id. Many people displaced within Nepal during the violent years
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such as fear of persecution, may preclude these people from asserting
their right to citizenship, thus rendering them de facto stateless. 40
Statelessness carries severe consequences, regardless of whether it
is de jure or de facto. 4 1 Among many other things, statelessness "limits
access to birth registration, identity documentation, education, health
care, legal employment, property ownership, political participation and
freedom of movement." 42 Denial of these rights affects not only
individuals but also society as a whole.43 Society as a whole is affected
because the exclusion of an entire sector of the population may create
unacceptable social tension and significantly impede efforts to promote
economic and social development." Statelessness may even lead to
forced displacement, particularly when it results from the arbitrary
deprivation of nationality.45
The deprivation of nationality has a significant impact on the
enjoyment of basic human rights, including civil, political, economic,
social, and cultural rights.4 6 As signatories to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), which addresses the obligation
of states to uphold various civil, political, social, and cultural rights, the
United States and the United Kingdom have a binding duty to abide by
its principles.4 7 Article 25 of the ICCPR provides for the right of every
citizen to take part in the conduct of public affairs, the right to vote and
to be elected, and the right to have access to public service. 48 For those
who have been deprived of their nationality, these political rights may be
unavailable.4 9 In some states, individuals without nationality may be
unable to vote, occupy certain state and public positions, or become
members of a political party."0 However, in many states, non-citizens

of the Maoist insurgency were faced with almost insurmountable difficulties in obtaining a
citizenship certificate. Id
40. See Milbrandt, supra note 34, at 82.
41.

See WAAS, supra note 7, at 12.

42.

Div. of Int'l Prot., supra note 21, at 4.

43.

See WAAS, supra note 7, at 12; see also BINGHAM ET AL., supranote 36, at 6.

44. Div. of Int'l Prot., supra note 21, at 5.
45. Id.
46. See Waas, supra note 26.
47. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
For a list of signatories to the ICCPR, see InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights,
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&

mtdsgno-IV-4&chapter=4&lang--en (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
48. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 25, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
49. A/HRC/19/43, supra note 30,¶4.
50. Id ¶7.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol44/iss3/11
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who meet certain conditions are permitted to cast a vote or stand for
office in certain local elections. 5
Article 12 of the ICCPR provides for the right to liberty of
movement for everyone lawfully within the territory of a state.5 2 Persons
who have been deprived of nationality may face severe limitations on
their ability to travel." Despite international law protections, there are
some states in which the freedom of movement of non-citizens is
restricted and unavailable. 4 Restrictions on the freedom of movement of
stateless people has, in some instances, resulted in an inability to access
medical and educational services and, for some, has meant an
unaffordable fee just to travel outside of their respective villages."
Those who have their nationality revoked may also face violations
of the right to liberty pursuant to Article 9 of the ICCPR, which provides
that no one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest or detention.56 Detention is
often the most immediate and direct consequence of citizenship
revocation." The U.N. Office of the High Commissioner on Human
Rights ("U.N. Office") has considered practices that involve detaining
non-citizens and has labeled them violations of the right to liberty." The
U.N. Office classifies an arbitrary detention as one in which the state
cannot provide an appropriate justification.59 For example, the U.N.
Office found a detention of a non-citizen for a period of four years was
arbitrary and unlawful because the state failed to demonstrate that, in
light of the person's particular circumstances, there were no
less invasive means of achieving the same ends.o The U.N. Office
has also expressed concern over the prolonged detention of non-citizens
suspected of committing terrorist-related offenses.' In these

51. Id. 6.
52. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 48, art. 12.
53. A/HRC/19/43, supranote 30, ¶ 8.
54. Id 110.
55. Id
56. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 48, art. 9.
57. A/HRC/19/43, supra note 30, $ 15. The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has stated
that detention is a direct response to either the irregular status of the person within a state or a lack
of identity documentation that may itself also be a direct consequence of arbitrary deprivation of
nationality. Id. According to the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, statistics indicate that in
some countries, the number of non-citizens in administrative detention exceeds the number of
sentenced prisoners or detainees who have or are suspected of having committed a crime. Id.
58. Id. at 16.
59. Id.
60. See Fong v. Australia, Communication No. 1442/2005, U.N. Human Rights Commission,
¶ 9.3, CCPR/C/97/D/1442/2005 (Nov. 23, 2009), http://www.refworld.org/docid/4bld223d2.html.
61. A/HRC/19/43, supra note 30, 1 16.
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circumstances, the U.N. Office has indicated that detention of noncitizens is to be avoided and should only be used in exceptional
circumstances, or as a last resort, and only for the shortest
possible time.62
The revocation of citizenship affects not only individual rights but
also collective rights of groups, leading, in some instances, to conflicts
and wars.63 The Advisory Board on Human Security, created to advise
the U.N. Secretary-General, looked closely at the effect of the denial of
citizenship on human security and found that nationality disputes have
directly contributed to internal, and even international, conflicts.' In
Bangladesh, for example, some 240,000 Biharis (primarily, non-Bengali
Muslims who fled from India during the partition of 1947, and who
supported West Pakistan during the 1971 secessionist struggle) continue
to live in camps, waiting for the day when they can take up residence
and citizenship in Pakistan.6 s Additionally, in the Middle East, despite
the progress that has been made in the peace process, the current and
future citizenship status of many Palestinian refugees throughout the
region is yet to be determined."6
Another example of an international conflict attributed to the denial
of citizenship involves a large number of ethnic Chinese residents in
Brunei, where citizenship has historically not been granted
automatically, but is determined by ethnic decent.67 In 1984, following
Brunei's independence, only a small minority of ethnic Chinese people
were granted citizenship by the government of Brunei." The others,
numbering around 20,000, lost their nationality and were rendered
stateless.69 It was not until the late 2000s that the Brunei government
instituted initiatives for the thousands of stateless residents to
obtain citizenship. 70

62.
63.

Id.
See id T 43.

64. WAAS, supra note 7, at 14.
65. U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES: A
HUMANITARIAN AGENDA 225-35 (1997); see also MINORITIES AT RISK PROJECT, ASSESSMENT FOR

BIHARIS IN BANGLADESH (2003), http://www.refworld.org/docid469f3a581e.html.
66.

See Abbas Shiblak, Stateless Palestinians,FORCED MIGRATION REV., Aug. 2006, at 8.

67. Minority Rights Grp. Int'l, World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous PeoplesBrunei Darussalam:Chinese, REFWORLD (2008), http://www.refworld.org/docid/49749d4832.html.
68. Id.
69. Zhao Shengnan, Stateless Residents Fightfor Sense ofBelonging in Brunei, CHINA DAILY
USA, Dec. 19, 2013, at 6, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2013-12/19/content17184934.htm.
70. Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol44/iss3/11
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The deprivation of nationality has effects on the rights of families,
the right to work, the right to healthcare, the right to housing, women's
rights, children's rights, and minority rights." Since the deprivation of
nationality can have such a detrimental effect on one's quality of life,
international law standards have been established to limit a state's ability
to revoke a person's citizenship and render her stateless.72 Throughout
history, international law has evolved to establish a fundamental
universal right to nationality and has enforced the correlative duty on
states to reduce the existence of statelessness.7 3
B. Developments in InternationalLaw Establishingthe Right to
Nationality and the Duty for States to Reduce Statelessness
International law instruments have developed to promote the right
to nationality and the right to not be stateless.74 Treaties between nations
have been formed in efforts to encourage fundamental human rights, like
the right to nationality and the right to not be rendered stateless.15 Even
though many nations are not signatories to such treaties, the principles
and rights established within those treaties are nonetheless enforceable
because of customary international law. 76
1. Treaties
The serious and detrimental effects of statelessness have led to
developments in international law.77 Two distinct, yet complementary,
conventions of international law emerged specifically to address the
issue of statelessness: the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of
Stateless Persons (or "1954 Convention")78 and the 1961 Convention on
the Reduction of Statelessness (or "1961 Convention"). 9 Both
conventions, taken in conjunction with each other, indicate the
unacceptability of the condition of statelessness occasioned by the denial
of the right to nationality."o
71. See A/HRC/19/43, supranote 30, ¶121-26, 30-44.
72. See infra Part II.B.
73. See infra Part II.B.
74. See A/HRC/25/28, supranote 29, 14.
75. See infra Part II.B.1.
76. See infra Part II.B.2.
77. WAAS, supranote 7, at 15.
78. Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons art. 1, 1 1, Sept. 28, 1954, 360
U.N.T.S. 117 [hereinafter 1954 Convention].
79. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness art. 9, Aug. 30, 1961, 989 U.N.T.S. 175
[hereinafter 1961 Convention].
80. WAAS, supra note 7, at 15. Despite the achievements of the two Conventions on
statelessness, there remains a need for stronger efforts by the international community to combat the
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a. The 1954 Convention
The 1954 Convention was designed to protect stateless
individuals": It formulated protections for those without any nationality
by providing them a set of basic rights.82 It represented the first
significant step towards defining and reducing statelessness and
connecting statelessness to the right to nationality." It aimed to regulate
the status of stateless persons and to ensure the widest possible
enjoyment of their human rights in lieu of nationality.8 4
The 1954 Convention defined a de jure stateless person and
established an internationally recognized status for stateless persons.85 It
notably extended specific rights, such as those relating to the issuance of
identity and travel documents, to stateless persons.86 The 1954
Convention was the first to recognize the profound vulnerability of
stateless persons and to set international standards for states to follow
when dealing with such persons.87 While the 1954 Convention was
aimed at improving the status of stateless persons, it did not oblige states
to provide them with residence or nationality." On its own, the 1954
Convention failed to provide states with clear instructions on how to
combat statelessness." However, with the establishment of international
human rights law, and through the subsequent practices of states, various
protections and mechanisms by which to protect stateless individuals
have developed.90

serious and pervasive issue, as "[i]t appears that the existing international legal framework has, as
yet, failed to stave off all of the detrimental consequences of a person being left unclaimed by any
state and this is causing various severe knock-on effects." Id.
81.

Objectives and Key Provisions of the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless

Persons, UNHCR (Oct. 1, 2001), http://www.unhcr.org/3bd7d3394.html.
82. See 1954 Convention, supra note 78; see also WAAS, supra note 7, at 16.
83. See Milbrandt, supra note 34, at 87. The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of
Stateless Persons is the "cornerstone of the international protection regime for stateless persons." Id.
84. See 1954 Convention, supra note 78; see also U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees,
Protectingthe Rights of Stateless Persons: The 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless

Persons, at 4 (June 2010), http://www.unhcr.org/4ca5941c9.html.
85. See 1954 Convention, supra note 78.
86. Id.; see also U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL, GUIDANCE NOTE OF THE SECRETARYGENERAL: THE UNITED NATIONS AND STATELESSNESS 4 (2011), http://www.refworld.org/

docid/4el 1 d5092.html.
87.
88.

See WAAS, supra note 7, at 228.
See MANDAL & GRAY, supra note 36, at 4 n.19.

89. See id. at 4.
90. Id. at 4 n.19. For example, a significant number of states provide persons recognized
as stateless in their territory with permission to stay for periods of up to five years, often on
a renewable basis. See EUROPEAN NETWORK ON STATELESSNESS, DETERMINATION AND
THE PROTECTION STATUS OF STATELESS PERSONS 36 (2013), http://www.refworld.org/

pdfid/53162a2f4.pdf.
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The United States is not a party to the 1954 Convention. 91
However, the rights of stateless individuals as well as the correlative
duty of states to protect stateless individuals and the right to nationality
have developed as norms of international law, which constitute
principles of customary international law. 92 Thus, the United States,
which is not a party to the treaties on statelessness, at a minimum would
be out of step with the direction of emerging international norms against
rendering people stateless, and at a maximum would be acting contrary
to customary international law.93 Since the deprivation of these
fundamental rights to stateless individuals is not in line with customary
international law and the clear direction of international law
development, the United States and the United Kingdom (which is a
party to the treaty) are nonetheless bound to exercise and establish the
rights of stateless individuals if they wish to be perceived as acting
within the rule of international law. 94
b. The 1961 Convention
The 1961 Convention goes further than the 1954 Convention in its
proactive aims at reducing the prevalence of statelessness by state
actions.9s At the time of the 1961 Convention, the elimination of
statelessness was seen as an integral "part of the protection of the human
rights of individuals." 96 Since the 1954 Convention only mitigated the
adverse effects of statelessness on individuals, the 1961 Convention was
thought to be necessary to reduce and eradicate statelessness itself.97 The
1961 Convention requires states to establish safeguards in legislation to
address statelessness occurring at birth or later in life.98

of

91. For a list of parties to the 1954 Convention, see Convention Relating to the Status
Stateless Persons, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/

pages/ViewDetailsll.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsgno=V-3&chapter-5&Tempmtdsg2&lang-en.
Unfortunately, the Conventions on Statelessness have very few state signatories, as compared with
other international law treaties. See WAAS, supra note 7, at 17. The reason there are very few states

as parties to the treaties turns on the reluctance of states to forfeit their sovereignty, to some extent,
in mandating state-specific nationality laws. Id.
92.
93.

See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
See WAAS, supranote 7, at 71.

94. Id.
95. See 1961 Convention, supranote 79; see also WAAS, supra note 7, at 4243.
96. Carol A. Batchelor, U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, The International Legal
Framework Concerning Statelessness andAccess for Stateless Persons, ¶ 12, at 5 (Jan. 8-9, 2002),

http://www.refworld.org/docid/415c3be44.html.
97.

WAAS, supra note 7, at 41.

98.

See 1961 Convention, supranote 79; see also Div. of Int'l Prot., supra note 21, at 5.
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Article 1 of the 1961 Convention provides: "A contracting State
shall grant its nationality to a person born in its territory who would
otherwise be stateless." 99 Article 4 demonstrates an even stronger duty
on states to eradicate statelessness and provides, in pertinent part, as
follows: "A Contracting State shall grant its nationality to a person, not
born in the territory of a Contracting State, who would otherwise be
stateless, if the nationality of one of his parents at the time of the
person's birth was that of that State."oo
Most states stipulate the ways in which nationals may lose their
nationality."0 ' The grounds for which a person's nationality may be lost
are contained in the domestic immigration or nationality laws of the
state.1 02 As sovereign entities, states enjoy discretion when establishing
these grounds.' 0 However, there are limitations to this sovereign power
via international law.104 One of the limitations on this sovereign power
to revoke a person's citizenship comes from the 1961 Convention. 0
The 1961 Convention recognizes some of the grounds that various
states invoke for a loss of citizenship."0 6 The 1961 Convention supports
the legitimate grounds for which a person's nationality may be lost,
when such grounds are not arbitrary and will not render a person
stateless.107 The fundamental human right to not be rendered stateless is
key when determining whether a ground for revocation can be invoked
or not.' 0
Article 8 of the 1961 Convention prohibits the deprivation of a
person's citizenship if it will render her completely stateless. 1 09
However, this prohibition is not absolute, and the 1961 Convention

99. See 1961 Convention, supra note 79, art. 1, ¶ 3.
100. Id art.4,11.
101. See A/HRC/25/28, supra note 29, ¶ 3.
102. Div. of Int'l Prot., supra note 21, at 5.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See 1961 Convention, supranote 79; see also Alice K. Ross, Home Secretary Strips Man
of UK Citizenship-for the Second Time, BUREAU INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Dec. 2, 2013),
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/12/02/home-secretary-strips-man-of-uk-citizenshipfor-the-second-time.
106. See A/HRC/25/28, supra note 29, 1 4.
107. Id
108. WAAS, supra note 7, at 194.
109. See 1961 Convention, supranote 79, art. 8, 1 1.
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provides a number of exceptions."o The 1961 Convention recognizes a
narrow set of circumstances in which loss or deprivation of nationality
leading to statelessness may serve a legitimate purpose."' The 1961
Convention permits a state to subject a national to statelessness in
various instances of failing to show proper allegiance, such as if the
person has acted "inconsistently with his duty of loyalty to the
Contracting State";" 2 or, has "taken an oath, or made a formal
declaration, of allegiance to another State, or given definite evidence of
his determination to repudiate his allegiance to the Contracting State.""'
The 1961 Convention goes further to provide that when a person has
committed "acts seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the State,"
the State may provide for the revocation of their nationality as a form of
punishment or as a response to the broken bond of allegiance or loyalty
to the State.1 4 This is especially relevant to the proposed anti-terror
legislation in the United States and United Kingdom, as those statutory
provisions offer a similar ground to revoke citizenship."
Although the 1961 Convention provides such a ground for the
revocation of citizenship, even if it renders the individual stateless, the
anti-terror legislation may still be invalid under international law." 6
Before such a determination is made, the context, history, and intent of
the legislation must be considered."' The U.N. Secretary-General issued
a report that stressed the need for greater scrutiny when denationalizing
an individual will result in is her statelessness:
Even in such cases, [where a legitimate ground to revoke an
individual's citizenship exists,] . .. the loss or deprivation of
nationality must satisfy the principle of proportionality. The
consequences of any withdrawal of nationality must be carefully
weighed against the gravity of the behavior or offence for
which the withdrawal of nationality is prescribed. Given the severity

110. See U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Expert Meeting: Interpretingthe 1961 Statelessness
Convention and Avoiding Statelessness Resulting from Loss and Deprivation of Nationality,
Summary Conclusions, ¶ 7, at 3, http://www.unhcr.org/5465e2cb9.pdf.
111. See 1961 Convention, supra note 79, art. 8, IM2-3.
112. Idart.8,¶3(a).
113. Id. art. 8, ¶ 3(b); see Emanuel Gross, Defensive Democracy: Is It Possible to Revoke the
Citizenship, Deport, or Negate the Civil Rights of a PersonInstigating TerroristAction Against His
Own State?, 72 UMKC L. REV. 51, 63 (2003).
114. See A/1HRC/25/28, supranote 29,1 12.
115. See supra note 6.
116. See OPEN SOC'Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, OPINION ON CLAUSE 60 OF UK IMMIGRATION BILL
& ARTICLE 8 OF UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON REDUCING STATELESSNESS 5 (2014),

http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/briefing-clause6O-03112014.pdf
[hereinafter OPINION ON CLAUSE 60].
117. Seeidat7-8.
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of the consequences where statelessness results, it may be difficult
to justify loss or deprivation resulting in statelessness in terms
of proportionality.11 8
In practice, the majority of states that are parties to the 1961
Convention have not invoked such grounds as a means to deprive
nationality if it leads to statelessness.ll 9 Because the consequence of
statelessness is so serious and detrimental to fundamental human rights,
this exception to the correlative duty of states to reduce statelessness
provided in the 1961 Convention is to be construed narrowly. 20
Subsequent reports by the United Nations have indicated that,
although exceptions to the duty of states not to render humans stateless
exist, international law strongly condemns the revocation of citizenship
if it will deem a person stateless. 121 In October 2013, the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees initiated a process to clarify specific
questions surrounding the avoidance of statelessness in the context of
loss and deprivation of nationality.1 22 One finding by international
experts stated that "the burden of proof lies with the State to establish
that an individual will not be rendered stateless and that loss or
deprivation can therefore proceed." 23 Accordingly, states must take a
closer look at their nationality laws to ensure that international standards
against rendering humans stateless are respected.1 24 Under international
law, the avoidance of statelessness is a high priority that cannot, and
should not, be overlooked.1 25
The United Kingdom's passage of Clause 60 of the British
Nationality Act led to some discourse on the United Kingdom's
obligations as a party to the 1961 Convention in light of the grant of
power to the Home Secretary to revoke citizenship and render people
stateless under the new legislation.1 2 6 When it became a party to the
1961 Convention, the United Kingdom declared its intention to retain its
existing powers to deprive an individual of citizenship even if this
resulted in statelessness, which was permitted on the basis of paragraph

118.
119.
120.

See A/HRC/25/28, supra note 29, T 4, at 4.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id.

121.

See OPINION ON CLAUSE 60, supra note 116, at 9.

122.

See A/HRC/25/28, supra note 29,

¶ 5; see also U.N.

High Comm'r for Refugees, Expert

Meeting: Interpreting the 1961 Statelessness Convention and Avoiding Statelessness Resulting from
Loss and Deprivation ofNationality, Summary Conclusions, ¶$ 11-14, at 4-5, http://www.unhcr.org/

5465e2cb9.pdf.
123. See A/HRC/25/28, supra note 29, 1 5, at 5.
124. Id. 13.
125. See Paulussen & Waas, supranote 16.
126.

See OPINION ON CLAUSE 60, supra note 116, at 1.
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3 of Article 8 of the 1961 Convention. 127 Subsequently, however, the
relevant domestic law was changed so that deprivation of nationality was
only permitted if it did not result in statelessness. 128 Most recently,
domestic law in the United Kingdom has changed to permit the
revocation of citizenship even if it does lead to statelessness.1 2 9 Because
this power to revoke citizenship and render humans stateless is illegal
under U.K. obligations to international treaty law, it relies on the
declaration it made at the time of assenting to the treaty, in accordance
with paragraph 3 of Article 8.130
However, this may not free the United Kingdom of its
obligations.13 1 Critics question whether the declaration under paragraph
3 of Article 8 continues to have an effect,' 32 as the United Kingdom later
relinquished the very power it sought to retain through that act, when the
domestic law changed to permit revocation of citizenship only if the
result would not lead to statelessness."' Additionally, under customary
international law, which is by its nature binding on all states, 134 the
United Kingdom may still be in violation of the international law on
statelessness in its passage of Clause 60 of the British Nationality Act. 3 1
2. The General Practices of States Accepted as Law or Customary
International Law
Despite the lack of parties to the two Conventions on statelessness,
it can be argued that the general practices of states accepted as law
reflects the trend of states to respect an individual's right to nationality
and reduce statelessness. 13 6 The adherence to these principles by states is
demonstrative of the overall emergence of customary international law
that is binding on all states.13 7 There is certainly a strong presumption in
favor of the prevention of statelessness in any change of nationality. 3 1

127. See MANDAL & GRAY, supra note 36, at 5.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See OPINION ON CLAUSE 60, supranote 116, at 2-3.
131. See MANDAL & GRAY, supra note 36, at 5.
132. Id.
133. See id.
134. Id
135. See infra Part II.B.2.
136. See Waas, supranote 26.
137. WAAS, supra note 7, at 39.
138. J.L. Blackman, State Successions and Statelessness: The Emerging Right to an Effective
Nationality Under InternationalLaw, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1141, 1183 (1998).
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The American Law Institute provides, in relevant part, that
"[c]ustomary international law results from a general and consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation." 3 9
Further, in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,
the court is obliged to examine "international custom, as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law" in its determination of disputes in
international law. 4 0 The international law that has developed in the past
fifty years on the right to nationality and the right to not be rendered
stateless indicates a uniform practice of states, accepted as law, to honor
an individual's right to nationality and not render people stateless.141
The earliest affirmation of the human right to nationality was made
in 1885, when the Institute for International Law formulated a number of
principles concerning the attribution of nationality, including "no one
shall be without a nationality" and "everyone shall have the right to
change nationality." 42 In 1930, under the support of the League of
Nations, 143 the Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the
Conflict of Nationality Laws was drafted as one of the first serious
attempts of states in the twentieth century to agree on a number of
basic rules applicable to states regarding matters of nationality.'" In
1984, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 4 5 was adopted as the
most influential international soft-law instrument to articulate the
fundamental human right to nationality.1 46 Article 15 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights clearly and simply states that "everyone
has the right to a nationality" and "no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of
his nationality."1 47
139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
LAW INST. 1986).

§

102 (AM.

140. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S.
No. 993.
141. Blackman, supra note 138, at 1183.
142.

RUTH DONNER, THE REGULATION OF NATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (2d ed.

1994) (discussing the concept of nationality within the scope of international law and the ongoing
struggle of sovereign nations in maintaining power over its laws of nationality, while also abiding
by principles of public international law).
143. The League of Nations, developed as an international organization of states after the
end of World War I, aimed at maintaining and promoting world peace. See THE ORIGIN,
STRUCTURE & WORKING OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 60 (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2d prtg.

2004, 2003) (1929).
144. WAAS, supra note 7, at 37.
145. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 25. The United States voted for the
Resolution adapting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and was the chief architect
of its foundation. See Anup Shah, The USA and Human Rights, GLOBAL ISSUES,
http://www.globalissues.org/article/139/the-usa-and-human-rights (last updated Aug. 21, 2002).
146. WAAS, supra note 7, at 41 n.56.
147. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 25, art. 15. The right to nationality
was seen as the foundation of other rights. Id.
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Many additional international law treaties also formed, further
suggesting the emergence of a general customary law with a sense of
legal obligation applicable to all states. The 1961 Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness established, and legally endorsed, the right of
humans to nationality and forbade denationalization "on racial, ethnic,
religious or political grounds."l4 8 The International Convention on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination,14 9 which entered into force in
1965, required that the right to nationality not be denied for
discriminatory reasons."so The ICCPR,'" which entered into force in
1976, discussed the right of "[e]very child... to acquire a
nationality,"'5 2 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child,' entered
into force in 1989, guaranteed the right of every child to acquire a
nationality and placed a duty on state parties to respect that right.s4
Several regional treaties also address the human right to
nationality.1 5 Article 20 of the American Convention on Human Rights
provides that "every person has the right to a nationality" and that "every
person has the right to a nationality of the State on whose territory he or
she was born if he or she does not have the right to any other
nationality.""' Article 4 of the European Convention on Nationality

148. 1961 Convention, supra note 79, art. 9.
149. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 5,
Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. The United States and the United Kingdom are parties to the
International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. For a list of signatories to the
Convention, see International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination,UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.

aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg no=IV-2&chapter=4&lang-en.
150. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra
note 149, art. 5.
151. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 48, art. 24. The United
States and the United Kingdom are signatories to the ICCPR. See supra note 47 and accompanying
text.

152. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 48, art. 24.
153. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 7, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. The United
States and the United Kingdom are parties to the Convention on the Rights of the Child. For a list of
signatories to the Convention, see Status of Convention on the Rights of the Child, UNITED NATIONS
TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/PagesNiewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-11
&chapter=4&lang-en.
154. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 153, art. 9.
155. WAAS, supranote 7, at 38.
156. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 20, Nov.
22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. The United States is a signatory to the American
Convention on Human Rights. For a list of signatories to the Convention, see American Convention
on Human Rights, ORG. AM. STATES, http://www.oas.org/dil/treatiesB-32_AmericanConvention_
onHumanRights sign.htm.
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provides that the rules on nationality of each state that is a party should
be based on the principles that "everyone has the right to a nationality";
"statelessness is to be avoided"; and, "no one should be arbitrarily
deprived of his or her right to nationality."15 1
In addition to these affirmations on the international law stage of
the right to nationality and the duty of states to reduce statelessness,
individual states have also taken action, reflecting the notion that
the general practice of states in affirming the right to nationality
and reducing statelessness is part of customary international law
and thus binding on all states.'"5 The United States, despite not being
a party to the 1954 and 1961 Conventions on statelessness, engages
in practices that are consistent with them-thus accepting the principles
and not vociferously objecting to the international law that
has developed over the past fifty years.' As the single largest donor to
the UNHCR-the agency created to protect the stateless-the
United States has demonstrated a strong adherence to the principles of
the 1954 and 1961 Conventions.1 60 The U.S. Department of State
provides "humanitarian assistance and engages in diplomacy to prevent
and resolve statelessness" and "advocates on behalf of stateless people
with foreign governments and civil society organizations, and conducts
field monitoring of the conditions and challenges that stateless
people encounter."'61
The prevalence of international law instruments, as well as the
emergence of general practices of states confirming the right to
nationality and the duty to reduce statelessness, reflects a greater
consensus in the international law community supporting that this
custom of international law exists.' 62 Thus, the United States and the
United Kingdom have an obligation under international law to respect
the right to nationality and avoid statelessness.1 63 As a result, the
citizenship-revocation anti-terror legislation in both states is likely to be

157.
213.
158.
159.

European Convention on Nationality art. 4, Nov. 6, 1997, E.T.S. No. 166, 2135 U.N.T.S.
Blackman, supra note 138, at 1183.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§

102

(AM. LAW INST. 1986) ("[Iln principle a state that indicates its dissent from a practice while the law
is still in the process of development is not bound by that rule even after it matures .... A state that
enters the international system after a practice has ripened into a rule of international law is bound
by that rule.").
160.

See

Statelessness, U.S.

DEP'T

ST.,

http://www.state.gov/j/prm/policyissues/issues/

c50242.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
161. Id.
162. See Waas, supra note 26.
163. Blackman, supra note 138, at 1183.
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in violation of international law." There are alternative and effective
means of achieving the goals of the legislation without violating the
international law on nationality and statelessness.16 1
III.

PROPOSED ANTI-TERROR LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES
AND UNITED KINGDOM PROMOTE STATELESSNESS

Federal lawmakers in the United States have recently proposed
legislation that would allow revocation of U.S. citizenship when a
person has been suspected of terrorist activities, even if the revocation
leaves the person stateless and with no nationality.' Identical anti-terror
legislation has recently been enacted in the United Kingdom.' 6 ' The
United Kingdom is a party to various international law treaties that
address statelessness, and the United States also has obligations under
customary international law to abide by the international human rights
law on nationality and reducing statelessness.1 68 This Part studies and
analyzes anti-terror legislation in the United States and the United
Kingdom through the lens of international human rights law, with a
particular focus on its ramifications for individuals who might be
rendered stateless.169
A.

ProposedLegislation in the United States

Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World
Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the attempted attack on the White
House, there have been numerous bills either drafted or introduced in
Congress that, if enacted, would revoke American citizenship of those
citizens suspected of terrorist activities.' 7 0 The bills have been a focal
point of legislative concern for over ten years, and they all aim to
achieve the same result-to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1965'l to include an additional ground to revoke citizenship.172 The
164. Id.
165. See infra Part IV.
166. Charlie Savage & Carl Hulse, Bill Targets Citizenship of Terrorists'Allies, N.Y. TIMES,
May 7,2010, at A12.
167. Katrin Bennhold, Britain Expands Power to Strip Citizenship from Terrorism Suspects,
N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2014, at A6.
168. See supra Part II.
169. See infra Part 1.A-B.
170. See Enemy Expatriation Act, H.R. 545, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015); Expatriate Terrorists Act,
S. 2779, 113th Cong. § 2 (2014); Enemy Expatriation Act, H.R. 3166, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011);
Enemy Expatriation Act, S. 1698, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011); DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, § 501.
171. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); see 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (2012).
172. See S. 2779; H.R. 3166; S. 1698; DEP'TOF JUSTICE, supranote 6, § 501.
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additional provision would provide that "engaging in or having provided
material support to a terrorist organization" serves as a ground for
revocation of citizenship.1 3
Most recently, on September 8, 2014, Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX)
introduced the Expatriate Terrorists Act in the Senate.' 74 This bill is
particularly aimed at revoking citizenship of Americans who join
ISIS. 17 5 Additionally, the bill would alter the requirements for stripping
U.S. nationals of their citizenship to include those who "became a
member of' or provided "material assistance" to a "designated foreign
terrorist organization."l76 This measure would apply to both natural-born
and naturalized U.S. citizens and would, thus, lead these individuals to
become stateless if they did not have another nationality."'7 The
legislation was eventually blocked in the Senate, primarily because of
the grave constitutional implications the bill would have on U.S.
citizens, including the infringement on due process and equal protection
rights."17 As the threat of terrorism continues to grow, future
introduction and possible enactment of legislation with similar aims
seems likely.' 79
In 2011, Senators Joe Lieberman (I-CT) and Scott Brown (R-MA)
and Representatives Charlie Dent (R-PA) and Jason Altmire (D-PA)
each introduced the Enemy Expatriation Act in the Senate and House of
Representatives.'s The bill added "engaging in or purposefully

173.

See S. 2779.

174.

See Meghan DeMaria, Ted Cruz Introduces Expatriate Terrorist Act to Stop Americans

from Joining ISIS, WEEK (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.theweek.corn/speedreads/index/267748/
speedreads-ted-cruz-introduces-expatriate-terrorist-act-to-stop-americans-from-joining-isis.
175. Join ISIS, Lose US Citizenship? Lawmakers Target Americans Sympathizing with Terror
Groups, Fox NEWS (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/09/09/lawmakerstarget-americans-sympathizing-with-isis-terror-groups-in-new-wave.
176. S. 2779.
177. See Ed Hornick, Bill Aims to Strip CertainAmericans of Their Citizenship, CNN (May 7,
2010, 5:36 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/05/06/terrorism.act.change.
178. See David Sherfinski, Dems Block Cruz Bill to Strip U.S. Citizenshipfrom Islamic State
Defectors, WASH. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/sep/18/
dems-block-cruz-strip-citizenship-isis-defectors.
179. See Nicholas Watt et al., David Cameron Pledges Anti-Terror Law for Internet After
Paris Attacks, GUARDIAN (Jan. 12, 2015, 5:04 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/
2015/jan/12/david-cameron-pledges-anti-terror-law-internet-paris-attacks-nick-clegg. Following the
January 7, 2015, attack in Paris on the French satirical weekly newspaper, CharlieHebdo, tensions
rose throughout the world, sending some Western governments to reevaluate and strengthen their
domestic anti-terror laws. See id.
180. Ben Frumin, Lieberman on Revoking Terrorists'Citizenship: 'American Citizenship Is a
Privilege, Not a Right,' TPM (May 5, 2010, 9:37 PM), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/lieberman
-on-revoking-terrorists-citizenship-american-citizenship-is-a-privilege-not-a-right-video?ref-fpi. In
the proposal of this legislation, Senator Lieberman was reported to be "merely suggesting that the
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and materially supporting hostilities against the [United States]" to the
list of acts for which U.S. nationals would lose their nationality.'' It
further defined "hostilities" broadly as any conflict subject to the laws of
war. 8 2 The legislation would "empower the federal government to
dispossess citizens of their citizenship and send them into stateless
exile."' 3 The legislation was eventually referred to a committee in both
houses of Congress, but was never scheduled for a hearing, and the bill
eventually died.184
The Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003 ("Patriot Act
I")Y" was drafted by the staff of Attorney General, John Ashcroft, and
was leaked to the public by the Center for Public Integrity.'8 6
Section 501 of the legislation, entitled "Expatriation of Terrorists,"
provided for the denationalization of a citizen if the government
determined that the citizen had either joined or provided material support
to a terrorist organization.' If enacted, this legislation would apply to
both natural-born and naturalized U.S. citizens, who could be rendered
stateless if their citizenship was revoked under its grounds and they had
no other nationality.'
Section 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, codified in
8 U.S.C. § 1481, which the three aforementioned anti-terror legislative
proposals are attempting to amend, provides the grounds upon which the
U.S. government may expatriate an American citizen.'8 9 In the United
States, a person cannot be denationalized.1 90 Denationalization is the
U.S. update a decades-old statute that calls for Americans who join foreign armies fighting the U.S.
to lose their citizenship." Id.
181. Enemy Expatriation Act, H.R. 3166, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011); Enemy Expatriation Act,
S. 1698, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011).
182. See H.R. 3166; S. 1698.
183. Herbert W. Titus & William J. Olson, The Proposed Enemy Expatriation Act: Sending
American Citizens into Exile, AM. THINKER (Jan. 20, 2012), http://admin.americanthinker.com/
2012/01/the_proposed enemyexpatriation act sendingamericancitizensintoexile.html.
184. H.R. 3166.
185.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supranote 6,

§ 501.

186. Graham, supra note 18, at 594.
187. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, § 501. One of the most troubling aspects of this draft
legislation is the elimination of the government's burden to prove a citizen's intent to renounce
citizenship. See Graham, supra note 18, at 607. Currently, under the Immigration and Nationality
Act, the government must prove that the citizen had an intention to relinquish his citizenship. See id
However, under the Domestic Security Enhancement Act of2003, there is a presumption of intent to
relinquish citizenship based solely on a person's connection to a terrorist group. Id. For a discussion
on the constitutionality of the intent-presuming provisions, see Peter J. Spiro, Expatriating
Terrorists, 82 FORDHAM L. REv. 2169, 2176 (2014).
188. See Graham, supra note 18, at 608.
189. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 § 349, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (2012).
190. Steven S. Goodman, Note, Protecting Citizenship: Strengthening the Intent Requirement
in ExpatriationProceedings, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 341, 344, 355 (1988).
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"forcible divesture" of citizenship by the government.19' The only way
for the U.S. government to revoke a person's citizenship is through the
process of expatriation.1 92 Today, expatriation requires (1) a voluntary
act of renunciation or abandonment of nationality and allegiance, and (2)
an intent to relinquish citizenship. 19 3
Section 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, without the
proposed additions, states that a person who is a national of the United
States, by birth or naturalization, shall lose her citizenship by voluntarily
engaging in certain enumerated activities with the intention of
relinquishing U.S. nationality.1 9 4 Section 1481 specifies the seven
expatriating acts: (1) obtaining naturalization in a foreign state; (2)
taking an oath of allegiance to a foreign state; (3) serving in the armed
forces of a foreign state (if the armed forces are engaged in hostilities
against the United States or the person serves as a commissioned or
noncommissioned officer); (4) accepting or performing the duties of a
government office of a foreign state; (5) making a formal renunciation of
U.S. nationality in a foreign state; (6) making a formal written
renunciation of nationality, while in the United States, if the country
is in a state of war; and (7) committing an act of treason against the
United States.' 95
The Expatriate Terrorists Act of 2014, the Enemy Expatriation Act
of 2011, and the Patriot Act II all seek to amend the Immigration and
Nationality Act to include terrorism as one of the enumerated voluntary
activities that leads to expatriation.' 96 The draft and proposed legislation
have all attempted to add "joining in, or providing material support to, a
terrorist organization ... if the organization is engaged in hostilities
against the United States, its people, or its national security interests"'9 7
as a grounds to revoke citizenship, even if the result is statelessness.1'9 8
191.

Id.at344n.14.

192.

CLARK HANJIAN, THE SOVRIEN: AN EXPLORATION OF THE RIGHT TO BE STATELESS 50-

51 (2003).
193. See Graham,supra note 18, at 609.
194. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 § 349, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (2012).
195. Id. § 1481(a)(l)-(7).
196. See Expatriate Terrorists Act, S. 2779, 113th Cong. § 2 (2014); Enemy Expatriation Act,
H.R. 3166, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011); Enemy Expatriation Act, S. 1698, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011);
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, § 501.
197. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 6,

§ 501.

198. Critics fear that the proposed legislation's reliance on over-broad definitions of "terrorist
organization," "providing material support," and "hostilities" will lead to ordinary people being
labeled as terrorists and facing revocation of their citizenship and possible statelessness. See
Graham, supra note 18, at 606. The definition of "domestic terrorism" as provided by the Patriot
Act includes any activity that "involves acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the U.S." See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
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Legislation in the UnitedKingdom

The United Kingdom has used revocation of citizenship as a means
to combat domestic terrorism for the past eight years.1 99 The aggressive
U.K. anti-terror legislation on citizenship revocation has resulted in the
loss of citizenship for more than forty individuals.2 00 The United
Kingdom is one of a few western countries that have revoked citizenship
and its associated rights from dual citizens suspected or convicted of acts
of terrorism or disloyalty.20 1 Under the British Nationality Act of
1981,202 the Home Secretary can remove someone's citizenship with no
warning and no judicial approval in advance where she feels this would
be "conducive to the public good."203 In almost every case of revocation,
the Home Secretary, Theresa May, has issued the revocation order while
the individual was abroad, preventing people from returning home
while fighting appeals that can last years.204 In a number of those
cases, the very individuals who had their citizenship revoked
were soon after killed in drone strikes.205 Critics of the anti-terror
56, 115 Stat. 272 § 802(a)(5) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). The
definition of "hostilities" as provided by the Enemy Expatriation Act of 2011, includes any conflict
subject to the laws of war. H.R. 3166; S. 1698. Currently, "material support or resources" is
defined to include "currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial
services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or
identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives,
personnel . .. transportation," and other physical assets except "medicine or religious materials." 18
U.S.C. § 2339A (2012).
199. See Thomas Peter, 'Stateless Extremist' Muslim Stripped of UK Citizenship, Appeals to
Supreme Court, RUSSIA TODAY (Nov. 18, 2014, 2:48 PM), http://rt.com/uk/206555-uk-citizenshiprevoked-appeal.
200. See Bennhold, supranote 167.
201. See id.
202. British Nationality Act, 1981, c. 61, § 40 (U.K).
203. See Alice K. Ross & Patrick Galey, Home Secretary Pushes Through 'Controversial'
Powers to Make People Stateless, BUREAU INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Jan. 30, 2014),

http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2014/01/30/home-secretary-pushes-through-controversialpowers-to-make-people-stateless.
204. See Ross, supra note 105.
205. See id. One controversial way revocation of citizenship has been used in the United
Kingdom, and can potentially be used in the United States, is by killing those suspected of terrorism
after revoking their citizenship while they are abroad. See Chris Woods & Alice K. Ross, Former
British Citizens Killed by Drone Strikes After Passports Revoked, BUREAU INVESTIGATIVE
JOURNALISM (Feb. 27, 2013), http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/02/27/former-britishcitizens-killed-by-drone-strikes-after-passports-revoked. The United Kingdom has employed this
technique in the past and continues to do so despite strong opposition by human rights groups. See
NAT'L COUNCIL FOR CIVIL LIBERTY, LIBERTY'S REPORT STAGE BRIEFING ON CLAUSE 64 OF THE
IMMIGRATION BILL IN THE HOUSE OF LORDs (2014), https://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk. As
of 2013, a report by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism found that "since 2010, the Home
Secretary, Theresa May ... revoked the passports of 16 individuals," many of whom were
subsequently killed in drone strikes conducted by the United States. Woods & Ross, supra. For
example, Bilal al Berjawi and Mohamed Sakr, two former citizens of the United Kingdom, had their
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legislation, concerned with constitutional rights of individuals,
also argue that the nationality revocation legislation may be a
roundabout means to enable extrajudicial killings of citizens while
they are abroad to avoid the major constitutional and fundamental
human rights obligations of states to respect citizens' due process and
other domestic law rights. 20 6
The U.K. government has gone even further in its revocation
powers through the passage of Clause 60 of the Immigration Bill. 207 On
May 14, 2014, the Parliament of the United Kingdom passed the
Immigration Bill, which includes a clause that is aimed at dealing with
the domestic threat of terrorism.2 08 Clause 60 of the U.K. Immigration
Bill provides that the Home Secretary may deprive naturalized
individuals of their British citizenship through revocation if they have
engaged in acts seriously prejudicial to the interests of the United
Kingdom.209 The troubling part of this legislation is that it applies to
natural-born U.K. citizens who could now be rendered stateless if found
guilty of such a prejudicial act and if they have no other nationality.210
1. The Case of Hilal Al-Jedda
The passage of such legislation has caused the emergence of
various cases of stateless individuals in the United Kingdom. 211 One
such case, thought to have inspired Home Secretary May to propose
Clause 60 of the Immigration Bill in the first place, is that of Hilal AlJedda. 2 12 Mr. Al-Jedda was born in Iraq and arrived in the United
Kingdom in 1992 as a refugee.2 13 He was eventually naturalized as a
British citizen in 2000, and he subsequently lost his Iraqi citizenship.214
citizenships revoked in 2010 and died two months apart in two U.S. drone strikes in Somalia in
2012. See Alice Ross, Theresa May, Citizenship and the Power to Make People Stateless,
OPENDEMOCRACY UK (Dec. 19, 2013), https://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/alice-ross/
theresa-may-citizenship-and-power-to-make-people-stateless.
206. Woods & Ross, supra note 205.
207. See Bennhold, supra note 167.
208. See Ross & Galey, supra note 203.
209. Immigration Act, 2014, c.22, § 66 (U.K.).
210. See Paulussen & Waas, supra note 16.
211. Dilwar Hussain, Statelessness and Britain'sSecret Courts, ALJAZEERA (Dec. 20, 2014,
4:13 PM), http://www.aljazeera.com/humanrights/2014/12/statelessness-britain-secret-courts-2014
121895842702446.html (discussing the controversial legislation in the United Kingdom and its
grant of new powers to the U.K. Border Agency and Police, allowing them to revoke passports of
citizens charged with terrorism who subsequently are given no due process of law or opportunity to
respond in a court of law).
212. Home Secretary v. Al-Jedda, OPEN SOC'Y FOUND., http://www.opensocietyfoundations.
org/litigation/home-secretary-v-al-jedda (last updated Oct. 28, 2013).
213. Id.
214. Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol44/iss3/11

24

Farooq: Expunging Statelessness from Terrorist Expatriation Statutes

2016]

EXPUNGING STA TELESSNESS

957

In 2004, Mr. Al-Jedda went to Iraq and, shortly thereafter, British forces
detained him on the grounds that he took part in armed attacks on
Coalition forces. 2 1 5 Before Mr. Al-Jedda was released from detention,
the U.K. government executed an order depriving Mr. Al-Jedda of his
British citizenship. 2 16 Mr. Al-Jedda appealed the government's order to
revoke his citizenship, beginning his battle to regain citizenship and
return home, which continues today.2 17
Mr. Al-Jedda first appealed to the Special Immigration Appeals
Commission, where the government succeeded in arguing that Mr. AlJedda had reacquired Iraqi citizenship automatically under a new Iraqi
law.2 18 Mr. Al-Jedda filed an appeal to the court of appeals, which
disagreed with the Special Immigration Appeals Commission and found
that Mr. Al-Jedda was not an Iraqi citizen. 21 9 The court of appeals was
unpersuaded by Home Secretary May's argument that Mr. Al-Jedda
could regain Iraqi citizenship by making an application and the resulting
statelessness would not be through her order, but rather through his
failure to apply for Iraqi citizenship. 220 Home Secretary May filed an
appeal to the Supreme Court, which finally ruled in Mr. Al-Jedda's favor
in October 2013-that the government's order revoking Mr. Al-Jedda's
U.K. citizenship would, in fact, illegally render him stateless. 22 1
Despite the U.K. Supreme Court's ruling on the illegality of Home
Secretary May's action in ordering the revocation of Mr. Al-Jedda's
citizenship, on November 1, 2013, Home Secretary May issued a new
order revoking Mr. Al-Jedda's British nationality. 2 22 The litigation lasted
215. Id. Nevertheless, "[t]he European Court of Human Rights later found [Mr. Al-Jedda's]
detention had violated the European Convention on Human Rights." Id.
216. See Ross, supra note 105.
217. See id.
218. Home Secretary v. AI-Jedda, supra note 212. The main burden on the government in
this case was to establish that Mr. Al-Jedda had another nationality and would thus not be
rendered stateless by the Order. See Alice Ross & Olivia Rudgard, How One Man Was Strippedof
His UK Citizenship-Twice, OPENDEMOCRACY (July 11, 2014), https://www.opendemocracy.net/
opensecurity/alice-ross-olivia-rudgard/how-one-man-was-stripped-of-his-uk-citizenship%E2%80%
94twice. Statelessness is a serious violation of human rights, and the government knew that to
render Mr. Al-Jedda stateless would be illegal under international law. See Paulussen & Waas,
supra note 16.

219. Home Secretary v. AI-Jedda, supra note 212.
220. Id.
221. See Ross, supra note 105. The Supreme Court rejected the government's argument that
Mr. Al-Jedda was stateless as a result of his own action of not re-applying for Iraqi nationality,
following the removal of Saddam Hussein's government, and not because the Home Secretary
revoked his British nationality. See Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't v. Al-Jedda, [2013] UKSC 62
(stating the ability of the Secretary of State to assert that the person in question could quickly and
easily re-acquire another nationality would create confusion in the application of what should be a
straightforward exercise).
222. See Bennhold, supra note 167. This incident "is the first time the Home Secretary is
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six years and resulted in a unanimous decision, but "[r]ather than
accepting the findings of the court, just three weeks later, Home
Secretary May made a fresh order depriving [Mr. Al-Jedda] of his
British citizenship,"22 3 which resulted in revocation of his citizenship for
the second time. Home Secretary May sought enactment of Clause 60 of
the Immigration Bill, which would ensure the success of revocation
orders against those like Mr. Al-Jedda.224 Subsequently, Clause 60 of the
Immigration Bill made its way through Parliament and became law in
May 2014.225 Mr. Al-Jedda remains in proceedings today under the
current law, which allows the Home Secretary to revoke British
nationals of their citizenship, even if doing so renders them stateless.22 6
There are serious issues with the current legislation that are still
being examined and evaluated by the U.K. Supreme Court. 2 27 The
United Kingdom's obligations under international treaty law,
particularly as a party to the 1961 Convention, are to be considered
when evaluating the legality of the legislation.228
2. The Case of Minh Pham
In July 2011, Minh Pham, a Vietnamese-born British national, was
indicted on charges of terrorism in the United States after spending
seven months in Yemen. 2 29 Following his indictment, Mr. Pham was
arrested in London to be extradited to the United States, but Home
Secretary May ordered authorities to deprive Mr. Pham of his British
citizenship and deport him to Vietnam. 230 Vietnam refused to accept

known to have removed the same person's citizenship twice, using powers that leading human
rights lawyer Gareth Peirce has compared to 'medieval exile-just as cruel and just as arbitrary."'
See Ross, supra note 105.

223. Id
224. Ross & Rudgard, supra note 218.
225. See Bennhold, supra note 167.
226. See Ross & Rudgard, supra note 218.
227. Jane Croft, UK's Highest Court Hears StatelessnessAppeal, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2014),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/52e5dece-6flf-l 1e4-b060-00l44feabdcO.html#axzz3OoOYkn3h.
228. See Ross, supra note 105.
229.

Victoria Parsons, Supreme CourtHears Second Deprivationof Citizenship Case, BUREAU

INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2014/l 1/20/
supreme-court-hears-second-deprivation-of-citizenship-case.
230. See Peter, supra note 199. Mr. Pham was wanted in the United States for terrorism-related
crimes, as he allegedly plotted to kill American citizens. Id. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
filed an indictment against Mr. Pham, and, as a result, he was then detained in the United Kingdom.
See Cahal Milmo, Al-Qa'ida 'Online PropagandaExpert' Arrested in Britain, INDEPENDENT (July

5, 2012), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/alqaida-online-propaganda-expert-arrestedin-britain-7917278.html.
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Mr. Pham as its national, saying its 2008 nationality law only recognized
single nationality for Vietnamese citizens.2 3' Mr. Pham challenged
the revocation and deportation orders passed by Home Secretary May
and succeeded.2 32
Mr. Pham argued that if the order was passed, the revocation would
render him stateless, which was not allowed under the British
Nationality Act of 1981233 and international law obligations. 23 4 The
Special Immigration Appeals Commission found that, if at the time the
Home Secretary took the decision to deprive Mr. Pham of his British
citizenship Vietnam did not consider him to be a national, then the
deprivation order would be barred.235 Thus, Home Secretary May could
not revoke Mr. Pham's citizenship because doing so would, in fact,
render him stateless.23 6
As expected, Mr. Pham remains in custody and in proceedings as
Home Secretary May has appealed the case to the U.K. Supreme
Court.2 37 Home Secretary May argues that under the newly passed
Clause 60 of the Immigration Bill, citizenship of a British national can
be revoked if it is "conducive to the public good" and the person acted
"in a manner which is seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the
United Kingdom," even if doing so would have the effect of making the
person stateless. 238
Despite the passage of Clause 60 of the Immigration Bill, the Court
seemingly remains hesitant to enforce such legislation because of its
detrimental effects on individuals who may become stateless.2 39 Cases
such as Mr. Al-Jedda's and Mr. Pham's have developed, and will
continue to develop, as the War on Terror proceeds. 2 40 As such, the
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Parsons, supranote 229.
Id.
British Nationality Act, 1981, c. 61, § 40(4) (U.K).
See 1961 Convention, supra note 79.
See Parsons, supranote 229.
See Peter, supra note 199.
See id.
Immigration Act, 2014, c.22, § 66 (U.K.); see also Simon Cox, Case Watch: UK Supreme

Court Struggles with Pham Stateless Conundrum, OPEN SOC'Y FOUND.

(Nov.

19, 2014),

http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/case-watch-uk-supreme-court-struggles-phamstatelessness-conundrum (discussing arguments made by the U.K. government and Mr. Pham, and
the Supreme Court's struggle in determining the applicability and role of the U.N. Statelessness
Conventions in this case).

239. See Cox, supranote 238.
240. Alice K. Ross & Patrick Galey,

Rise in Citizenship-Stripping as Government

Cracks Down on UK Fighters in Syria, BUREAU INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Dec. 23, 2013),

http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/12/23/rise-in-citizenship-stripping-as-governmentcracks-down-on-uk-fighters-in-syria. In 2013, "the Home Secretary, Theresa May, ha[d] removed
the citizenship of 20 individuals." Furthermore, "[iun total, May has removed the citizenship of 37
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recent legislative proposals and enactments in the United States and the
United Kingdom should be scrutinized for their legality under both
domestic and international law.2 4 1
IV.

ADEQUATE DOMESTIC LAW MECHANISMS EXIST TO ACHIEVE
LEGISLATIVE GOALS WITHOUT RENDERING HUMANS STATELESS

National security, a goal of all sovereign nations, promotes the need
of governments to develop creative methods to ensure the safety of the
population. 24 2 One of the greatest goals of the Obama administration has
been ensuring national security by combatting terrorism threats.24 3
Arguably, the greatest national security threat facing the United States
comes from domestic sources. 2 " The threat of homegrown or domestic
terrorism has continued to develop in the last ten years, as indicated by
numerous incidents in the last decade carried out by a variety of terrorist
groups consisting of white supremacistS 245 and Christian extremists. 24 6
A classic struggle for any democratic government is ensuring that
individual liberties and human rights are not compromised, and that the
rule of law is upheld when national security interests are pursued. 24 7 As
the threat of domestic terrorism looms, the understandable desire for the
government to pass anti-terrorism legislation continues, all while
hopefully ensuring that individual liberties and human rights are not

people since entering office in mid-2010, according to figures assembled by the Bureau of
Investigative Journalism." Id. The investigation also found that "48 of the 53 incidents of people
stripped of their British citizenship since 2002 happened under the current U.K. government, which
came to power in 2010. Over half of these cases were on the grounds of national security and
counter-terrorism." Tom Lawson, As United Nations Tackles Statelessness, United Kingdom Takes

a Step Back, OCCUPY.COM (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.occupy.com/article/united-nations-tacklesstatelessness-united-kingdom-takes-step-back.
241.
242.

See supra Part I.
See DEP'T OF DEF., SUSTAINING U.S. GLOBAL LEADERSHIP: PRIORITIES FOR THE 21ST

CENTURY DEFENSE 1 (2012) (containing a discussion by President Barack Obama on the United
States's enduring national security interests and his plans to seek a just and sustainable international
order where the rights and responsibilities of nations and peoples are protected).
243. Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: National Strategy for Counterterrorism
(June 29, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/29/fact-sheet-nationalstrategy-counterterrorism.
244. Robert Wright, ISIS and the Forgotten, Deadly Threat of Homegrown Terrorism,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/09/will-obamas-isisstrategy-actually-worsen-the-terror-threat/380465.
245.

See

Ed

Payne,

Fraizer Glenn

Cross

'Entrenched in

the Hate

Movement,'

http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/14/us/kansas-shooting-suspect-profile/index.html?hpt-hp tl
CNN,
(last updated Apr. 31, 2014, 8:03 PM).
246. See Monica Davey, Doctor's Killer Puts Abortion on the Stand, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/29/us/29roeder.html.
247.

See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 8.
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infringed upon.248 These individual liberties and human rights have
sources in both domestic and international law. 249 Although the
citizenship-revocation anti-terror legislation discussed in this Note raises
various constitutional and domestic law concerns, 25 0 the main concern,
as indicated in Part II, is the obligation of sovereign nations under
international law.25
Fully adequate domestic law mechanisms currently exist to achieve
domestic legislative policy goals in the War on Terror without violating
long-accepted international law practices to ensure people's right to
nationality and protection against statelessness.252 The significant
inconsistencies that proposed U.S. legislation and enacted U.K.
legislation have with international law demonstrate the need for greater
scrutiny and care when drafting anti-terror legislation.253 The statutory
goals of the War on Terror that aim to ensure the security of the nation
and its citizens can be achieved without violating the international law
set out in Part 11.254 As the leading democracies of the world, the United
States and the United Kingdom arguably have a special obligation to
respect and adhere to international law and the rule of law.255
To ensure effective compliance with international law, the United
States and the United Kingdom should not enact anti-terror legislation
that compromises the liberties and rights of individuals that flow from
international law.256 The legislatures in both sovereign nations have
ways to fully ensure national security and effectively combat terrorism
while, at the same time, adhering to international law obligations that
ensure citizens' liberties and fundamental human rights.257 If legislation
is passed without violating obligations under international law and
fundamental international human rights, such as the right to nationality
and the right to not be rendered stateless, while still successfully

248.

See CONST. RTs. FOUND., supranote 3.

249.

See Graham, supranote 18, at 618.

250. See Lauren Prunty, The TerroristExpatriation Act: Unconstitutional and Unnecessay.
How the Proposed Legislation Is Unconstitutionaland Redundant, 26 J. CIv. RTs. & ECON. DEV.

1009, 1025 (2013) (discussing the inadequacies of the proposed revocation legislation, focusing
mainly on its unconstitutionality and violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
251. See supra Part H.
252. See infra Part W.A-B.
253.
254.

255.
4, 2014),
256.
257.

See OPINION ON CLAUSE 60, supranote 116, at 9.
See supra PartII.

See Heath Pickering, Why Do States Mostly Obey InternationalLaw?, E-INT'L REL. (Feb.
http://www.e-ir.info/2014/02/04/why-do-states-mostly-obey-international-law/#_ftn26.
See Graham, supranote 18, at 618.
See infra Part IV.A-B.
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combatting threats of terrorism, a firm unobjectionable precedent for
future legislation and action can be set. This Part sets out two different
proposals that aim to combat the threats of terrorism while maintaining
and upholding the fundamental international human rights to nationality
and to not be rendered stateless.258
A.

Retaining JurisdictionOver TerrorSuspects

Revoking the citizenship of a person who may allegedly be disloyal
or acting against the interests of the state can be credibly characterized
as a mere reactive and ineffective means to deal with pervasive national
security concerns.2 59 Citizenship is often seen in the context of loyalty
and patriotism. 260 It is the means by which we are able to differentiate
between each other: "the marker between 'us' and 'them."' 261 When a
fellow citizen is acting disloyally or against the interests of the state,
taking away his citizenship may seem like a viable and effective tool to
ensure domestic tranquility.262 As a means of casting out those who
already have demonstrated disloyalty against the nation, revocation
seems, on the surface, harmless and may even appeal to a larger, loyal
populace. 263 That is, symbolically, citizenship is meant for the loyal and
patriotic.2" Thus, taking away that citizenship from the disloyal and
unpatriotic may seem appropriate.2 65 According to some, suspected
terrorists should not be allowed to enjoy the rights of citizenship, all the
while plotting to destroy the nation.266 Despite these attractive
justifications, revocation of citizenship may not be the most effective
anti-terror policy for a government to utilize.2 67 The policy goals of

258. See infra Part IV.A-B.
259. Andy J. Semotiuk, Immigration Law: Is Revoking the Citizenship of TerrorSuspects Right
or Wrong?, FoRBES (Oct. 1, 2014, 11:51 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andyjsemotiuk/
2014/10/01/immigration-law-is-revoking-the-citizenship-of-terror-suspects-right-or-wrong. But see
Jay Sekulow, Paris Lessons: US Must Revoke Citizenship of Americans Who Join ISIS, Al
Qaeda, Fox NEWS (Jan. 14, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2015/01/14/paris-lessons-usmust-revoke-citizenship-americans-who-join-isis-al-qaeda.
260. Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 479
(2000).
261. Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist,49 UCLA L. REv. 1575, 1592 (2002).
262. See Sekulow, supra note 259.
263. See id.
264. See Volpp, supra note 261, at 1592.
265. See Sekulow, supra note 259.
266. See id
267. See Semotiuk, supranote 259.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol44/iss3/11

30

Farooq: Expunging Statelessness from Terrorist Expatriation Statutes

20 16]

EXPUNGING STA TELESSNESS

963

ensuring domestic tranquility and providing for the national security can
still be achieved without utilization of revocation powers that may
violate both international and domestic constitutional law.268
The reliance on denaturalization as a security tool to deal with
criminal behavior "is an abdication of society's responsibility in dealing
with such conduct." 26 9 When revoking an individual's citizenship, a
government effectively loses control over that individual. 27 0 Revocation,
which usually occurs once the individual leaves the country and goes
abroad, makes it harder and more problematic for a government to
maintain jurisdiction and control over that individual. 27 1 Revoking the
citizenship of a potentially dangerous individual who allegedly acted
against the interests of his home state may tackle the problem of
domestic homegrown terrorism, but it is unlikely to cater to national
security interests alone.272 By merely revoking a suspected terrorist's
citizenship, "instead of capturing and prosecuting the accused, we will
simply be dumping the problem in someone else's back yard." 2 73
Revocation, at the very most, may allow a country to avoid dealing with
a potentially problematic individual by simply exiling him to a far-away
land where, hopefully, he can cause no harm.2 74
A better and more effective means of achieving policy goals, while
abiding by international human rights standards and obligations, is
retaining jurisdiction over terror suspects who are citizens of the state. 2 75
By retaining jurisdiction over the suspected terrorists, the government
can maintain power over the individual, punish the offender, and
help deter other citizens from engaging in terrorist activities, all
while ensuring both national security and compliance with international
law standards.276

268. See Graham, supra note 18, at 617.
269. Andy J. Semotiuk, Express Entry-RadicalizedExtremists Coming Home as Citizens-or
Is There Something Wrong Here?, FORBES (Aug. 4, 2015, 12:47 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
andyjsemotiuk/2015/08/04/express-entry-radicalized-extremists-coming-home-as-citizens-or-isthere-something-wrong-here/#3cc455761bl0.
270. See Graham, supra note 18, at 618.
271. U-T San Diego Editorial Bd., Don't Let American Terrorists Return Home, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB. (Sept. 12, 2014, 5:00 PM), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2014/sep/12/americanterrorists-islamic-passport-citizenship.
272. Semotiuk, supra note 269.
273. Id
274. The 'Stateless': What Happens If You Take Away Citizenship?, CHANNEL 4 NEWs (Sept.
5, 2014), http://www.channel4.com/news/islamic-state-citizenship-extremists-law. Revoking the
citizenship of suspected terrorists is more of a "knee-jerk" reaction from the government than an
effective means of ensuring national security. Id.
275. See Semotiuk, supra note 269.
276. See id.
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With the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act
("NDAA"), the government already has plenary power of surveillance
over citizens suspected to be engaged in terrorist activities.277 Section
1061 of the NDAA expanded on the scope of surveillance established by
the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT)
Act of 2001 ("Patriot Act") and the Authorization of Use of Military
Force Act.278 Section 1061(a) authorizes the Secretary of Defense to
"establish a center to be known as the 'Conflict Records Research
Center' ("CRR Center"). 279 According to the current text of the NDAA,
the CRR Center is to compile a "digital research database including
translations and to facilitate research and analysis of records captured
from countries, organizations, and individuals, now or once hostile to the
[United States]."28 0 With this expanded surveillance power, the U.S.
government can keep track of those it deems to be seriously dangerous,
rather than simply exiling them to a faraway land.281 The policy goals of
the anti-terror revocation legislation will surely be met through
surveillance and incarceration for terrorist activities, rather than through
the exile and loss of jurisdiction over such a potentially dangerous
threat.282 With increased surveillance, if an individual is found to have
engaged in terrorist activities, evidence against the individual obtained
through surveillance can be used against them in a lawful prosecution
and sentencing procedure.2 83
The U.S. government has various means to bring charges against
dangerous, suspected terrorists without revoking their citizenship and
rendering them stateless. Three such ways these suspected American
terrorists can be tried and brought to justice are as ordinary criminals,
enemy combatants, or Americans who have committed treason.284

277. Joe Wolverton, II, House Passes 2014 NDAA; NSA Surveillance Will Lead to Indefinite
Detention, NEW AM. (June 27, 2013), http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/congress/item/
15829-house-passes-i 4-ndaa-nsa-surveillance-will-lead-to-indefinite-detention.
278. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, H.R. 1540, 112th Cong.
§ 1061(a) (2011).
279. Wolverton, supra note 277.
280. Id.
281. Rebecca A. Copeland, War on Terrorism or War on Constitutional Rights? Blurring the
Lines ofIntelligence Gathering in Post-September 11 America, 35 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1, 2-3, 11-12

(2004).
282.
283.

See Semotiuk, supra note 269.
See Copeland, supra note 281, at 21.

284. See JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40932, COMPARISON OF RIGHTS IN
MILITARY COMMISSION TRIALS AND TRIALS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL COURT, 10-11 (2014); Kristen

E. Eichensehr, Treason in the Age of Terrorism: An Explanation and Evaluation of Treason's
Return in DemocraticStates, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1443, 1458 (2009).
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Criminal trials for suspected terrorists in the United States are the most
common means of bringing charges against terrorism suspects. 28 5 By
ensuring a criminal trial in an American federal court, the various
protections that are guaranteed to any criminal defendant will be granted
to all alleged terrorist defendants, ensuring fairness and due process.2 86
Other benefits of trying terror suspects in federal courts include the
increased resources and tools that exist in the federal court system that
will enable greater justice, as defendants will be able to be tried for a
variety of offenses; 287 the use of Mirandaand its public safety exception
to get lawful and imperative information from defendants through
interrogation;2 88 and, the secure protection of classified information.28 9
Another way suspected American terrorists can be tried is through
military commissions or tribunals as enemy combatants.29 0 Shortly after
the September 11, 2001, attacks, President George W. Bush issued a
new military order in the War on Terror. 29 1 The order called for the
Secretary of Defense to establish military tribunals or commissions to
conduct trials of non-citizens and, later, even American citizens accused
of terrorism either in the United States or in other parts of the world.292
A military tribunal or commission is different from a regular civilian
criminal court in that, in a tribunal, military officers act as both judge
and jury.293 After a hearing, guilt is determined by a vote of the
commissioners.294 Unlike a criminal jury, the decision does not have
to be unanimous. 295 Additionally, as an enemy combatant in a military
tribunal, a defendant would not receive all of the due process protections
285. Trying Terror Suspects in Federal Courts, HUM. RTS. FIRST (June 18, 2014),
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdflUSLS-Fact-Sheet-Courts.pdf.
Osama Bin
Laden's son-in-law, Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, was the most senior Al-Qaeda member to be tried in a
U.S. federal court. See Courtor Tribunal-WhichIs Better to Try Terrorism Suspects?, ALJAZEERA

AM. (May 20, 2014, 12:32 PM), http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/inside-story/articles/
2014/5/20/is-the-future-ofterrorismtrialsinuscivilcourts.html ("In March [2014], Abu Ghaith, the
spokesman for al Qaeda after the 2001 attacks, was convicted of supporting terrorists and conspiring
to kill Americans.").
286.
287.

See ELSEA, supra note 284, at 9-10.
Trying Terror Suspects in FederalCourts, supranote 285.

288. Id.
289. Id.
290. See Eichensehr,supra note 284, at 1493-94.
291. Military Tribunals, CONST. RTS. FOUND., http://www.crf-usa.org/america-responds-toterrorism/military-tribunals.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
292. Id Through the passage of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, U.S. citizens could be
held as Enemy Combatants. See id; Ari Shapiro, Bill Lets US. Citizens Be Held as Enemy
Combatants, NPR (Sept. 29, 2006, 3:02 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyld=6167856.
293. Military Tribunals, supra note 291.
294. Id.
295. Id.
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guaranteed to a defendant in a U.S. civilian criminal court.2 96 A
defendant would still have the following: the right to an attorney;
the presumption of innocence; the protection against self-incrimination;
the protection against double jeopardy; and, the ability to negotiate
and enter into a plea agreement when tried in a military tribunal, instead
of a federal criminal court.2 97 However, in a military tribunal, the
exclusionary rule, which keeps illegally seized evidence out of a civilian
criminal trial, does not apply.2 98 Additionally, the appellate process in a
military tribunal is not the same as the process in a criminal trial-there
are no appeals. Rather, a three-member panel selected by the Secretary
of Defense reviews the verdict.2 99 Lastly, in a military tribunal,
no verdict is final until approved by the President or the Secretary
of Defense.3 00
Some argue that the best method of trying American terror suspects
is by charging them with treason. 3 01 Treason is the only crime defined in
the Constitution, reflecting its historical significance.3 02 The Constitution
states: "Treason against the U.S., shall consist only in levying War
against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and
Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the
Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in
open Court."30 3 There are several reasons why proponents urge the
prosecution of American citizen terrorists for treason.304 One argument
is that an American terrorist-as an American found to have committed
an act of terrorism-should receive no privilege compared to nonAmerican terrorists.305 In fact, they should be subjected to harsher
punishment, as they have committed an additional crime.3 06
296. Id.
297. Id. But see Jennifer Trahan, Trying a Bin Laden and Others: Evaluating the Options for
Terrorist Trials, 24 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 475, 491 (2002) (listing certain safeguards that are not
provided in a military tribunal).
298. Military Tribunals,supra note 291.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. See Benjamin A. Lewis, Note, An Old Means to a Different End: The War on Terror,
American Citizens ... and the Treason Clause, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1215, 1251-52 (2006); Amitai
Etzioni, Charge American Terrorists with Treason, ATLANTIC (May 24, 2013), http://

www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/05/charge-american-terrorists-with-treason/276199.
302. See Eichensehr,supra note 284, at 1449.
303. U.S. CONST. art. III.
304. See Lewis, supra note 301, at 1252.
305. See Etzioni, supra note 301.
306. Id. For more reasons as to why prosecutions for treason may have several potential
benefits, see Eichensehr, supra note 284, at 1489-95. Benefits include reinforcing societal identity
and unity, deterring future treasons, providing retribution against the traitor, and clarifying the
procedural system under which terrorism should be addressed. Id
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The benefits of retaining jurisdiction over terror suspects far
outweigh the benefits of revoking the citizenship of suspected terrorists
and possibly rendering them stateless and in exile in a foreign country.3 07
The U.S. government has established many creative and effective ways
to combat the domestic threat of terrorism and ensure national
security.30 8 With the NDAA, the Patriot Act, and the establishment of
Military Commissions or Tribunals, there exist adequate means to meet
policy-based anti-terror goals.3 09 By simply, yet significantly, revoking
the citizenship of an individual, the government will lose jurisdiction
over the individual and may further jeopardize national security while
also violating international human rights law.310
B.

Revoking the Citizenship ofDual Citizens Only

Allowing the anti-terror revocation statutes to remain as they are,
but precluding their application towards those citizens who have no
other nationality and could potentially be rendered stateless, may avoid
the various conflicts the legislation currently has under international
law.311 By simply not applying the statute to natural-born or naturalized
citizens who have no other nationality, there will be no issue with the
international law on statelessness, as the statute will not promote that
consequence.312 National security interests will still be met by striking
the statelessness provision, as the government could revoke citizenship
of potentially dangerous terrorists who have dual nationality.313 This will
ensure the compliance with the international law on statelessness, which
is clear in its direction to promote the right to nationality and to impose a
legal duty on states to reduce statelessness.314
If a legislature determines that the remedy of stripping citizenship
of suspected terrorists is needed, it should only apply to dual national
citizens. " This would ensure respect and adherence to international
human rights law.316 The right to nationality is linked to the right to not
be rendered stateless, and legislatures should ensure that one's right to

307. Titus & Olson, supra note 183.
308. See Copeland, supra note 281, at 11-12.
309. See Press Release, Dep't of Just., Fact Sheet: Just. Dep't Counter-Terrorism Efforts Since
9/11 (Sept. 11, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/September/08-nsd-807.html.
310. See Semotiuk, supra note 269.
311. See Ross, supra note 105.
312. Graham,supra note 18, at 617.
313. See Parsons,supranote 229.
314. See supraPart II.
315. See Parsons,supranote 229.
316. Graham, supra note 18, at 617.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2016

35

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 11

968

HOFSTRA LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 44:933

"

nationality and the right to not be rendered stateless are protected.
International human rights law would pose no obstacle to applying
citizenship-revocation statutes to dual citizens.3 18
Although facially attractive, there are many serious international
law implications when the government revokes a person's citizenship. 19
Revoking an individual's citizenship and rendering her stateless if she
has no other citizenship raises grave international law violations.3 20 To
avoid such issues, currently proposed legislation should be amended to
not apply when revocation would render an individual stateless.
V.

CONCLUSION

Citizenship-revocation anti-terror legislation has been introduced to
the U.S. legislature on a number of occasions over the past twelve

317. Id.
318. In addition, proponents of the legislation may be forced to look at using nationality
revocation as a means to carry out more targeted counterterrorism techniques, namely extrajudicial
killings and indefinite detentions. See supranote 205 and accompanying text. If a similar tactic was
used in the United States, the various constitutional and international law infringements that
occurred when President Barack Obama authorized the targeted assassination of suspected
American-citizen terrorist, Anwar Al-Aulaqi, could have potentially been avoided if Anwar AlAulaqi was not a U.S. citizen at the time of his killing. See Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta-Constitutional
Challenge to Killing of Three US. Citizens, supra note 5. Revocation of citizenship can be used to
partially justify the use of another otherwise illegal counterterrorism technique: indefinite detention
of a former U.S. citizen captured in the United States without due process of law. Wolverton, supra
note 277. Technically, the NDAA does not clarify whether a U.S. citizen could be indefinitely
detained without due process of law on terrorism charges. See Cora Currier, Cutting Through the
Controversy About Indefinite Detention and the NDAA, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 7, 2012, 8:41 AM),
http://www.propublica.org/article/cutting-through-the-controversy-about-indefinite-detention-andthe-ndaa. In his signing statement, President Barack Obama sought "to clarify that [his]
Administration will not authorize the indefinite military detention without trial of American
citizens." Press Release, The White House, Statement by the President on H.R. 1540 (Dec. 31,
2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/12/31/statement-president-hr-1540. Devon
Chaffee, a legislative counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union, said that revocation of one's
U.S. citizenship "could theoretically be used to circumvent current laws, including the NDAA." See
Ashely Portero, 'Enemy ExpatriationAct' Could Compound NDAA Threat to Citizens Rights, INT'L
Bus. TMIES (Jan. 24, 2012, 2:52 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/enemy-expatriation-act-couldcompound-ndaa-threat-citizen-rights-400024. If the amendment became law, the government could
potentially revoke the citizenship of anyone deemed to be supporting hostilities against the United
States, thereby subjecting him to the indefinite military detention provision of the NDAA. Id.
Despite the "effectiveness" of extrajudicial killings and indefinite detentions, these techniques may
not even be completely legal. See Erin Creegan, CriminalizingExtrajudicialKillings, 41 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 185, 214-15 (2013); Kevin Costello, Comment, Without a Country: Indefinite
Detention as ConstitutionalPurgatory,3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 503, 517-18 (2001). There are serious
constitutional law and international law implications related to these practices. See Creegan, supra,
at 312-14; Costello, supra, at 517-18.
319. A/HRC/19/43, supra note 30, 1.
320. SeesupraPartlI.
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years.32 1 Similar legislation has gone even further in the United
Kingdom, as reflected in Clause 60 of the Immigration Bill of May
2014.322 As the War on Terror intensifies, so does the pressure to
increase national security.3 23 One of the most troubling potential
consequences of the citizenship-revocation anti-terror legislationwhich has support in the United States and even more so in the United
Kingdom-is the possible effect of rendering human beings stateless.3 2 4
International law, which has developed in the last fifty years,
correctly imposes a duty on states to respect the right to nationality and
to reduce statelessness.3 2 5 The United States and the United Kingdom
have obligations, as nations that respect and abide by the rule of law, to
uphold the fundamental human right to nationality and reduce
statelessness, rather than to enact legislation that promotes statelessness
of human beings.3 26 Legislative and policy goals to enforce national
security and protect against terrorism are legitimate and obtainable goals
that can be fully met without offending fundamental international human
rights law.3 27
The ability of a state to maintain jurisdiction over suspected
terrorists and have a choice to try them in a criminal court or military
tribunal for treason fully allows the state to uphold the perception of
legitimacy on the international law stage by not violating fundamental
human rights.328 It also ensures the security and safety of the nation. 32 9
Another method that avoids the possible outcome of statelessness is the
application of citizenship-revocation anti-terror legislation only to those
who have another nationality.33 0 This would prevent humans from being
rendered stateless and would avoid violations of international law and
fundamental human rights.3 3
The U.S. Congress has the opportunity to achieve valuable
legislative goals without the appearance of acting contrary to the rule of
international law and fundamental human rights. As the leading
321. See Enemy Expatriation Act, H.R. 545, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015); Expatriate Terrorists Act,
S. 2779, 113th Cong. § 2 (2014); Enemy Expatriation Act, H.R. 3166, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011);
Enemy Expatriation Act, S. 1698, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011).
322. Immigration Act, 2014, c.22, § 66 (U.K.).
323. See, e.g., Terrorism Laws: 'Time Is Right'for New PolicePowers, BBC (Nov. 24, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-30173238.
324. See supraPart III.
325. See supraPart H.
326. See supraPart H.
327. See supraPart IV.
328. See supraPart [V.A.
329. See Semotiuk, supranote 269.
330. See supraPart I.B.
331. See Graham, supranote 18, at 617.
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democracy in the world, the United States should seize this opportunity
to serve the cause of the War on Terror, human rights, and the rule of
international law and reject enactment of laws that render human beings
stateless contrary to the right to nationality. Alternative methods at
achieving security in the increasingly terror-stricken world can be met
without compromising fundamental human rights.
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